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I S S U E  DEFINITION 
W i t h  t h e  d e c l a r a t i o n  o f . . m a r t i a l  law i n  P o l a n d  o n ,  D e c .  1 2 ,  1 9 8 1 ,  P o l i s h  
a u t h o r i t i e s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n v o k e d  f o r c e  a n d  t h e  t h r e a t  o f  f o r c e  t o  s u p p r e s s  
t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t  t r a d e  U n i o n ,  S o l i d a r i t y ,  a n d  t o  r e v e r s e  t h e  " r e n e w a l w  
m o v e m e n t  s p a r k e d  b y  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  S o l i d a r i t y  i n  t h e  summer o f  1 9 8 0 .  
T h e  r e g i m e ' s  f u t u r e  p o l i t i c a l  c o u r s e  i s  u n c e r t a i n ,  a s  i s  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  
r e v i v e  i t s  f a i l i n g  e c o n o m y  a n d  c a r r y  i t s  $ 2 6  b i l l i o n  f o r e i g n  d e b t .  O p i n i o n s  
d i f f e r  a s  t o  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  W e s t e r n  e c o n o m i c  p o l i c y  t o w a r d  P o l a n d :  t o  
h e l p  t h e  P o l i s h  p e o p l e  o r  t o  p e n a l i z e  t h e  P o l i s h  g o v e r n m e n t .  U . S .  a n d  W e s t  
E u r o p e a n  d e c i s i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  P o l i s h  d e b t ,  d e f a u l t ,  a n d  e c o n o m i c  
a s s i s t a n c e  w i l l  b e  s t r o n g l y  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  Warsaw's p o l i t i c a l  a n d  e c o n o m i c  
p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  by  t h e  g e n e r a l  c o n t e x t  o f  E a s t - W e s t  r e l a t i o n s .  
F o r  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  P o l i s h  e c o n o m y ,  t h e  P o l i s h  d e b t ,  a n d  
e v e n t s  l e a d i n g  u p  t o  m a r t i a r l a w ,  s e e  C R S  I s s u e  B r i e f  8 0 0 8 9 :  T h e  P o l i s h  
R e n e w a l  a n d  t h e  D e b t  P r o b l e m .  
B A C K G R O U N D  A N D  POLICY ANALYSIS 
THE IMPOSITION OF M A R T I A L  LAW 
A t  m i d n i g h t  o n  S a t u r d a y ,  Dec.  1 2 ,  t h e  P o l i s h  C o u n c i l  o f  S t a t e  i s s u e d  a 
p r o c l a m a t i o n  d e c l a r i n g  a s t a t e  o f  e m e r g e n c y  a n d  i n t r o d u c i n g  mart ia l  l a w .  A t  
t h e  s a m e  t i m e ,  a " M i l i t a r y  C o u n c i l  o f  N a t i o n a l  S a l v a t i o n v  was f o r m e d .  I t s  
m e m b e r s  a r e  h i g h - r a n k i n g  P o l i s h  a r m y  o f f i c e r s  u n d e r  t h e  c h a i r m a n s h i p  o f  P a r t y  
C h i e f ,  P r e m i e r ,  a n d  D e f e n s e  M i n i s t e r  G e n e r a l  W o j c i e c h  J a r u z e l s k i .  A c c o r d i n g  
t o  t h e  p r o c l a m a t i o n ,  " F o r  t h e  P o l i s h  p e o p l e ,  a h i s t o r i c  moment  a n d  t h e  l a s t  
c h a n c e  t o  i n t r o d u c e  o r d e r  i n  t h e i r  own home a n d  b y  t h e i r  own f o r c e s  h a s  - 
a r r i v e d . "  
U n d e r  t h e  martial  l a w  e d i c t ,  t h e  r i g h t  t o  s t r i k e  a n d  . t o  h o l d  p r o t e s t  
a c t i o n s  was s u s p e n d e d .  S o l i d a r i t y  was " s u s p e n d e d v ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t  y e t  d e c l a r e d  
i l l e g a l .  A l m o s t  a l l  g a t h e r i n g s  w e r e  b a n n e d  a n d  a c u r f e w  f r o m  1 0  p.m. t o  6 
a.m. was i m p o s e d .  S c h o o l s  w e r e  c l o s e d  e a r l y  f o r  t h e  w i n t e r  b r e a k  a n d  t h e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  s t u d e n t s '  u n i o n  was " d i s s o l v e d . "  A l l  n o r m a l  c h a n n e l s  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  a n d  t r a v e l  w i t h i n  P o l a n d ,  a s  w e l l  a s  b e t w e e n  P o l a n d  a n d  o t h e r  
c o u n t r i e s ,  w e r e  s u b j e c t  t o  s e v e r e  r e s t r i c t i o n .  More  t h a n  6 , 0 0 0  S o l i d a r i t y  
o f f i c i a l s ,  a c t i v i s t s ,  a n d  a n t i - g o v e r n m e n t  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  were i n t e r n e d ,  a s  
w e r e  a n u m b e r  o f  f o r m e r  h i g h - r a n k i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  o f f i c i a l s .  
Some a n a l y s t s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  m a r t i a l  l a w  was, i n  e f f e c t ,  
a m i l i t a r y  c o u p  d ' e t a t .  O t h e r s  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  P a r t y  r e m a i n e d  f i r m l y  i n  
c o n t r o l ,  h i d i n g  b e h i n d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  b e c a u s e  t h e  P a r t y  was d i s c r e d i t e d  i n  
P o l a n d  w h i l e  t h e  a r m y  e n j o y e d  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h  p r e s t i g e .  A n o t h e r  v i e w  i s  t h a t  
t o p  p a r t y  l e a d e r s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  P a r t y  i t s e l f  h a d  b e c o m e  s o  i n f l u e n c e d  b y  
S o l i d a r i t y  a n d  t h e  f o r c e s  o f  " r e n e w a l v  t h a t  a d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  m a r t i a l  l a w  was 
n e c e s s a r y ,  n o t  o n l y  t o  r e i m p o s e  o r d e r  a n d  o b e d i e n c e  i n  s o c i e t y  a t  l a r g e ,  b u t  
t o  r e i m p o s e  L e n i n i s t - s t y l e  d i s c i p l i n e  w i t h i n  t h e  P a r t y .  
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The relatively democratic party statutes and regulations which had been 
instituted during the period of renewal were suspended under martial law. 
Resignations reduced Party membership from 3.2 million to less than 2.5 
million. ,In addition, party hard-liners instituted a sweeping purge of the 
Party, government, news media, schools, and other key institutions, in the 
name of "ideological verification," expelling those who supported 
Solidarity's activities. 
POSSIBLE CAUSE AND TIMING 
There is considerable question as to the cause and timing of the 
imposition of martial law. Domestic factors may have been primarily 
responsible for provoking the government action. Party leadership may have 
felt threatened by the erosion of its own political power. At a Solidarity 
meeting in Radom on Dec. 3, 1981, seven militant demands were presented. 
These w-ere then adopted as the basis for the union's program at the Gdansk 
meeting of Solidarity's 107-aember policymaking national commission on Dec. 
11 and 12. The seven points included a general strike warning if the 
government were to enact a labor law empowering authorities to curb union 
activities and to impose a 3-month ban on strikes. The other demands were: 
an end to the Communist m.onopoly in broadcasting; union control over the 
economy and distribution system; introduction of economic reform based on 
enterprise self-government; creation of a special social council -- with 
control of the government's socioeconomic policies -- to oversee the economy; 
presentation to the Parliament of the statute on trade unions in the version 
agreed upon with Solidarity representatives; and finally, free and democratic 
elections to people's councils. 
On Saturday, Dec. 12, the Solidarity plenum directly challenged Communist 
rule by proposing a national referendum on setting up a non-Communist 
government and defining Poland's military relationship with the Soviet Union. 
The referendum was to ask the following questions: Are you in favor of a 
no-confidence vote against the Jaruzelski government? Are you for 
establishing a provisional government and free elections? Are you in favor of 
providing guarantees of Soviet military interests in Poland? Can the Party - 
be the instrument of such guarantees in the name of the whole society? 
Riot police raided Solidarity's Warsaw headquarters early on Dec. 13, a 
few hours after the Gdansk meeting issued its challenges to Poland's 
Communist authorities. 
According to Jaruzelski's speech of Dec. 13, Solidarity statements had 
"completely unmasked the true intentions of its leading bodies." A taped 
meeting of Solidarity leaders, with stress on confrontational statements by 
Walesa, was given wide play in the Polish media as proof that the trade union 
was seeking to unseat the Polish government. The latest Solidarity threats 
of further strike action may have been seen by the Polish leadership as the 
final straw, although many observers reject this assessment, arguing that the 
imposition of martial law was planned well in advance. 
The proclamation of martial law may have been in response to increased 
Soviet pressure on the Polish leadership. A Dec. 10 TASS report charged that 
Solidarity had set up vcommando units," that weapons and explosives had, been 
stolen from state warehouses, and that Solidarity planned to take over Polish 
television and radio on Dec. 17. The most serious accusation from Moscow was 
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that there had been demands from some Solidarity members for Poland to 
withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and to "use the lines of communication passing 
through Polish territory to pressure Poland's allies." The reference to the 
Poles' "last chance to introduce order in their own home" in the state 
~0uncil''s proclamation supports this view. 
The martial law decree may also have been a response to a fear of a 
general breakdown of law and order. Public dissatisfaction over 
deteriorating economic conditiOns may have been heightened by the onset of 
colder weather. With the approach of Christmas, the scarcity of f o ~ d  and 
consumer goods may have been seen by the government as creating an explosive 
atmosphere. 
The imposition of martial law on Dec. 12 may have been the implementation 
of a long and carefully planned government counterattack against Solidarity 
for which the provocative Solidarity statements at Radom were merely a 
convenient pretext. Proponents of this view point to the government's 
dispatch of small army units throughout the countryside earlier in the autumn 
as a preparation for martial law. 
CONDITIONS OF MARTIAL LAW 
In the months since martial law was imposed, the regime has moved toward 
relaxing some of its most stringent features, such as curfews, bans on 
personal travel and resttictions on long-distance communication, in an 
attempt to restore some semblence of "normalcy." However, recurrent episodes 
of popular resistance to the regime have caused authorities frequently to 
reimpose harsh controls. There also continue to be widespread reports of 
passive resistance and clandestine opposition to the martial law regime: 
work slow-downs,. distribution by Solidarity activists of pamphlets and 
leaflets urging various forms of resistance to martial law, clandestine radio 
broadcasts, symbolic gestures of opposition to the martial law regime, street 
rallies and demonstrations, and greatly increased emigration. Officials have 
acknowledged 23 deaths and many. hundreds of injuries in clashes between 
Polish workers and the police and armed forces since Dec. 13, 1981. Of the 
6,000 Solidarity members and leaders interned in December 1981, approximately 
600 are still being held. In addition, according to official reports, tens 
of thousands of Poles have been summoned to appear before special courts for 
violations of martial law. 
Lech Walesa, the former Solidarity leader, was held for months near Warsaw 
while authorities tried to persuade him to use his influence to get 
Solidarity members to go back to work "for the good of the nation." Walesa 
refused to negotiate with martial law authorities without the participation 
of the entire Solidarity national leadership group, most of whom had been 
detained by authorities. Some are in hiding. The four top Solidarity 
leaders who escaped the authorities' dragnet in December formed an 
underground Solidarity Provisional Coordinating Commission in April 1982. A 
few who were out of the country on Dec. 1 2  formed what could be called a 
Solidarity leadership council-in-exile in Western Europe. 
In the succeeding months the Jaruzelski regime was unable to secure the 
cooperation of the interned Solidarity leadership, or to silencg the 
opposition of the underground Solidarity organization. But Solidarity failed 
in repeated attempts to arouse nationwide open resistance to martial law. 
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Finally, on Oct. 8, 1982, the authorities formally outlawed Solidarity. on 
Nov. 14 Lech Walesa was freed as a private citizen. 
THE CHURCH 
Polish Roman Catholic Primate Archbishop Josef Glemp repeatedly warned 
that open opposition to authority under martial law could result in 
bloodshed. He said that the Catholic Church would continue to demand the 
release of Poles arrested "without justif4cation." Glemp urged moderation, 
but a8 the extent of the crackdown on Solidarity became more evident, 
especially with reports of. widespread government violence against the 
populace and arrest, detention, and harassment of priests, the tone of 
statements by church leaders became increasingly hostile. Archbishop Glemp 
denounced what he called "military terrorization" of the people and called 
for an end to martial law and a speedy restoration of Solidarity activity. 
In Rome to consult with Pope John Paul 11, Glemp said "Poles are overcome by 
anger.... A place will be found for Solidarity, as there is a place for the 
church. 'I 
With the banning of Solidarity by the Jaruzelski regime, many Poles may 
look to the Church as the most legitimate functioning representative of their 
interests vis-a-vis the regime. In August, the Popef.s scheduled visit to 
poland to commemorate the 1300th anniversary of the "Black Madonna," Poland's 
holiest religious Shrine, was postponed to a later, date (subsequently 
announced as June 1983). -. 
EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY 
Polish authorities claim that industrial production began to rise soon 
after the imposition of martial law, in contrast to the decline in 
productivity during the montbs of Solidarity activity. Many outside 
observers claim that production declined sharply after mid-December due t o -  
slowdowns and other forms of passive resistance. 
Strikes are banned and severely dealt with. But workersq passive 
resistance, plus numerous shortages and bottlenecks due to U.S. economic 
sanctions, the virtual bankrupcy of the Polish economy, and the inefficiency 
of highly centralized planning, are apparently keeping industrial output at 
levels approximating those prevailing before martial law was imposed. 
The agricultural problem continues to be mainly one of distribution rather 
than supply. The 1981 and 1982 harvests were reported to be good, in 
contrast to the three dismal harvests of 1978-1980. But farmers are reported 
to be selling only a fraction of their produce to the state at official 
prices because the zloty has lost much of its purchasing power and there are 
relatively few manufactured goods available for farmers to buy. How 
effectively direct sales from peasants to city dwellers, barter, or "blackw 
markets are working is conjectural. Use of forced deliveries under martial 
law has been threatened but not yet instituted. Although the availability of 
foodstuffs, including many basic commodities, on the open market i& much 
reduced, famine is not believed to be an immediate danger. The United States 
and most West European states have cut off official aid to Poland, but 
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private aid efforts, some of it government-financed, are still being 
permitted by the Reagan Administration. 
The Soviet Union sent several large shipments of food to Poland 
immediately after the imposition of martial law. On Jan. 6, 1982, Moscow 
announed a grant to Poland of $3.4 billion in trade credits on easy terms. 
The Soviet-Polish trade protocol included a Soviet promise to supply food, 
raw materials, and energy to Poland. 
But a number of western analysts have concluded that Poland is not a major 
beneficiary of economic aid from the other communist regimes, and that in 
1982 Polish exports to CMEA countries increased, while imports from them 
decreased, from the 1981 level. 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES 
The United States Government continues to advocate -- as it has done since . 
the unrest in Poland began in 1980 -- nonviolent resolution of the situation 
based on constructive, cooperative agreements among the Polish people 
themselves. 
* 
The unilateral abrogation by Polish authorities of the historic economic, 
social, and political agreements concluded with Solidarity since mid-1980 is 
a source of great concern in the United States. .This has been underlined by 
many authoritative statements from the Reagan Administration and from the 
Congress. 
On Dec. 23, President Reagan announced a series of economic sanctions 
against the Government of Poland in response to its imposition of martial 
law. The sanctions included: (a) suspending U.S. Government-sponsored food 
shipments to Poland until "absolute aSSUranCeSn are received that 
distribution of these products is monitored by independent agencies (food 
shipments to Poland by private agencies are not affected); (b) stopping the 
renewal of Poland's export credit insurance by the U.S. Government-backed 
Export-Import Bank; (c) withdrawing U.S. civil aviation privileges from - 
Poland's national airline, Lot; and (d) denying to Poland's long-distance 
fishing fleet the right to operate in U.S. waters. 
The President stressed that, ntheSe measures are not directed against the 
Polish people. They are a warning to the Polish government that free men 
cannot and will not stand idly by in the face of brutal repression." 
The Polish and Soviet governments strongly criticized these U.S. measures, 
denouncing them as harsh blows against the Polish people and as unacceptable 
interference in the internal affairs of Poland. In the following weeks, most 
West European nations and Japan imposed limited economic and political 
sanctions against Poland: halting government credit, halting negotiations on 
rescheduling Poland's foreign debt payments, and restricting the travel of 
Polish diplomats. 
The question of economic sanctions against Poland has stirred debate 
within the United States and Western Europe. Some critics of U.S. policy 
argue that the imposition of martial law is a domestic Polish matter in-which 
the West should not seek to interfere. Others make the point that the 
economic sanctions ultimately penalize the hard-pressed Polish people, on 
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whose behalf the U.S. Government claims to be acting. 
At the other end of the spectrum are critics who charge that the U.S. 
sanctions are weak and ineffe,ctive, More should be done, they argue, either 
in concert with our allies or unilaterally, to force the martial law 
authorities to change their course or punish them for it. Advocates of this 
view point to Poland's $26'billion foreign debt as a ready means of exerting 
pressure on Warsaw. They were highly critical of the Reagan Administration's 
decision in late January 1982 to have the CCC make payments to U.S. banks on 
earli.er U.S. Government-backed loans to Poland. 
Supporters of the Reagan Administration's policy maintain that some 
significant U.S. response to the imposition of martial law was necessary in 
order to show strong U.S. displeasure and exert pressure on the martial law 
authorities. The limited U.S. sanctions are appropriate, they say, providing 
a "stick" but still leaving a ''carrotW with which to influence events in 
Poland. Precipitating Polish default, they argue, would surrender what 
economic leverage we now have, and would "let Poland off the hookw on their 
foreign debt. 
The Reagan Administration has indicated some flexibility on its policy 
toward Poland. On Oct. 9 ,  1982, one day after the Jaruzelski regime formally 
outlawed Solidarity, President Reagan responded with a decision to deprive 
Poland of most-favored-nation status, thereby increasing the import duty on 
nonagricultural goods from Poland. But in mid-December', the President hinted 
at willingness to ease or end economic sanctions against Poland if martial 
law were lifted (as was rumored at that time). 
President Reagan has also taken the lead in linking the imposition of 
martial law in Poland to the Soviet Union. On Dec. 29, he announced the 
imposition of economic sanctions against the U.S.S.R., which included: (a) 
stopping the export of U.S. electronic, computer, and energy-related 
technology to the U.S.S.R.; (b) denying civil aviation privileges to the 
Soviet national airline, Aeroflot; (c) restricting access by Soviet ships to 
U.S. ports; (dl closing the Soviet Purchasing Commission (a Soviet foreign 
trade agency) in New York; and (e) postponing negotiations on a new long-term 
U.S.-Soviet grain purchase agreement to replace the one-year agreement due to 
expire Sept. 30, 1982. 
In June 1982 the Administration justified its actions against the Soviet 
export gas pipeline (banning the shipment of all energy-related equipment to 
the U.S.S.R. from U.S. firms, their foreign affiliates, and foreign firms 
with U.S. patents and licenses) in part on the basis of the alleged Soviet 
role in Poland. 
As with the earlier economic sanctions against Poland, these sanctions 
against the U.S.S.R. are criticized by some as a misdirected overreaction to 
internal Polish developments beyond our control. Others argue that the 
sanctions are weak and ineffective because they don't go far enough and 
because they were imposed unilaterally by the United States. 
Those who seek tougher sanctions against the Soviet Union criticize a 
situation in which the United States denies additional food aid to Poland 
while permitting the Soviets to buy millions of tons of U.S. grain. They 
also call for Washington to precipitate Polish default on its debts to the 
West, thereby presumably placing the economic burden of martial law in Poland 
on Communist -- East European and Soviet -- shoulders. 
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Opponents of harsher sanctions argue that the U.S.-Soviet grain trade 
benefits the United States, and that throwing Poland into default would be a 
surrender of the most useful leverage the west has over future developments 
in Poland. 
For a discussion of linkage between Polish foreign debts and the 
Soviet-West European gas pipeline, see CRS Issue Brief 82020, Soviet Gas 
Pipeline: U.S. Options. 
LEGISLATION 
H.Con.Res. 240 (Zablocki et $1.) 
Reaffirms the support of the Congress of the Unit.ed States for the 
people of Poland. Introduced Dec. 15, 1981; called up by unanimous consent, 
considered, and passed the House Dec. 15, 1981. Referred to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on the same day. 
S.Res. 268 (Percy et al.) 
A resolution on the imposition of martial law in Poland. Introduced 
Dec. 15, 1981; called up by unanimous consent, considered, and passed the 
Senate Dec. 15, 1981 (roll call #491, 95-0). 
ii.Res. 304 (Nelligan et al.) 
Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the President 
should. seek a halt in any deportation proceedings involving Polish citizens 
until he determines that the political situation in Poland is stable. 
Introduced Dec. 14, 1981; feferred to the Committee on. the Judiciary. Called 
up.by committee uscharge, considered, and passed the House Dec. 15, 1981. 
See also CRS Issue Brief 80089, The Polish Renewal. 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
03/04/82 -- Col. Hipolit Starszak, an official of the Interior 
Ministry, said that about a dozen internees had applied 
to emigrate. He also said that 42,000 Poles had returned 
.from abroad since martial law was declared and 
estimated that about 96,000 were still abroad. 
03/03/82 -- U.S. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer said 
that President Reagan had decided to postpone any new 
economic sanctions'against the Soviet Union, pending 
consultation with the European allies. 
-- Polish Interior Minister Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak issued 
a communique formally announcing that the approximately 
4,000 Poles still interned and their families would be 
permitted to apply for passports to leave Poland as of 
Mar. 15. The communique also said that restrictions on 
foreign travel and on visits by foreigners would be 
relaxed. 
03/02/82 -- Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski returned to Warsaw after two 
days of talks in Moscow. A joint communique said: "It, 
was stressed by the Polish side that any attempts to 
resume actions aimed at causing economic disarray, at 
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r e s u m p t i o n  o f  a n a r c h y ,  d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  a t  c h a n g i ' n g  t h e  
s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  s y s t e m  w i l l  be c u t  s h o r t  m o s t  
r e s o l u t e l y  i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t o o . "  
-- P o l i s h  e d u c a t i o n  a u t h o r i t i e s  a n n o u n c e d  a new p o l i , t i c a l  
i n d o c t r i n a t i o n  p r o g r a m  t o  b e g i n  i n  O c t o b e r .  F i r s t  a n d  
s e c o n d  y e a f .  u n i v e r s i t y  s t u d e n t s  w i l l  d e v o t e  3 0 0  h o u r s  p e r  
y e a r  t o  i d e o l o g i c a l  s t u d y  o f  e c o n o m i c s ,  p h i l o s o p h y ,  p o l i t i c s ,  
a n d  s o c i o l o g y .  F o r  t h i r d  a n d  f o u r t h  y e a r  s t u d e n t s ,  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  h o u r s  w i l l  d r o p  t o  9 0  p e r  y e a r .  
0 3 / 0 1 / 8 2  -- J a r u z e l s k i  r e c e i v e d  a n  e n t h u s i a s t i c  w e l c o m e  i n  Moscow.  
H i s  2 - d a y  t r i p  t o  Moscow was h i s  f i r s t  f o r e i g n  v i s i t  s i n c e  
h e  became t h e  P o l i s h  P a r t y  C h i e f  i n  O c t o b e r  1 9 8 1 .  
-- A t  a K r e m l i n  d i n n e r  h o n o r i n g  J a r u z e l s k i ,  S o v i e t  P a r t y  C h i e f  
L e o n i d  B r e z h n e v  p r a i s e d  t h e  l ' t i m e l y  m e a s u r e s "  t a k e n  b y  t h e  
P o l i s h  l e a d e r s h i p .  B o t h  B r e z h n e v  a n d  J a r u z e l s k i  e m p h a s i z e d  
t h a t  P o l a n d  a l o n e  h a d  made t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  i m p . o s e  ma r t i a l  law. 
-- I n t e r i o r  M i n i s t e r  G e n .  C z e s l a w  Kisczczak a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  6 , 6 4 7  
p e o p l e  were i n t e r n e d  u n d e r  mart ia l  l a w  a n d  t h a t  a s  o f  F e b .  2 6 ,  
2 , 5 5 2  h a d  b e e n  r e l e a s e d .  3 0 0  m o r e  h a d  b e e n  r e l e a s e d  s i n c e  
F e b .  2 6 .  
0 2 / 2 8 / 8 2  ---  I n t e r i o r  M i n i s t e r  K i szczak  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  
t r a v e l  w i t h i n  P o l a n d  w o u l d  b e  r e l a x e d  e x c e p t  i n  b o r d e r  a r e a s . .  
0 2 / 2 7 / 8 2  -- A f t e r  a t w o - C a y  m e e t i n g  i n  W a r s a w ,  t h e  P o l i s h  C a t h o l i c  
e p i s c o p a t e  c a l l e d  f o r  a r e s u m p t i o n  o f  t a l k s  b e t w e e n  C o m m u n i s t  
a u t h o r i t i e s  a n d  S o l i d a r i t y  a n d  a p p e a l e d  f o r  a m n e s t y  f o r  t h e  
h u n d r e d s  o f  P o l e s  j a i l e d  f o r  m a r t i a l  l a w  v i o l a t i o n s .  
0 2 / 2 5 / 8 2  -- T h e  t w o - d a y  m e e t i n g  o f  t h e  P o l i s h  C e n t r a l  C o m m i t t e e  e n d e d  
w i t h  a r e s o l u t i o n  o f  " f u l l  s u p p o r t w  f o r  t h e  m a r t i a l  law 
regime.  J a r u z e l s k i ' s  c h o i c e s  f o r  a l t e r n a t e  members o f  t h e  
P o l i t b u r o ,  I n t e r i o r  M i n i s t e r  L i e u t .  G e n .  C z e s l a w  K i s z c z a k  
a n d  g o v e r n m e n t  e c o n o m i s t  M a r i a n  W o z n i a k ,  w e r e  e l e c t e d  b y  
- n e a r - u n a n i m o u s  v o t e s .  K i s z c z a k ' s  e l e c t i o n  b r o u g h t  t h e  
n u m b e r  o f  g e n e r a l s  i n  t h e  P o l i t b u r o  t o  f o u r .  
0 2 / 2 4 / 8 2  -- T h e  P o l i s h  C e n t r a l  C o m m i t t e e  m e t  f o r  a 2 - d a y  s e s s i o n ,  i t s  
f i r s t  m e e t i n g  u n d e r  mar t i a l  l a w .  
-- I n  h i s  a d d r e s s  t o  t h e  C e n t r a l  C o m m i t t e e ,  J a r u z e l s k i  s a i d  
t h a t  i t  was " i m p o s s i b l e "  t o  l i f t  mart ia l  l aw r e s t r i c t i o n s  
" t o  t h e  d e g r e e  we i n t e n d e d .  We a r e  p r e v e n t e d  b y  t e n s i o n s ,  
r a s h  a c t s ,  p o s t e r  c a m p a i g n s .  T h e y  a r e  p r o l o n g i n g  mar t ia l  
law."  
0 2 / 2 3 / 8 2  -- A t  a m e e t i n g  i n  B r u s s e l s ,  t h e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r s  o f  t h e  
E u r o p e a n  C o m m u n i t y  ag reed  t o  r e s t r i c t  i m p o r t s  f r o m  t h e  
S o v i e t  U n i o n  as  a s i g n  o f  d i s a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  r e p r e s s i o n  i n  
P o l a n d .  T h e y  a l s o  a p p r o v e d  $ 9  m i l l i o n  i n  f o o d  a i d  t o  P o l i s h  
c i v i l i a n s .  - -- T h e  o f f i c i a l  P o l i s h  n e w s  a g e n c y ,  PAP, s a i d  t h a t  L e c h  Walesa 
had b e e n  " t h e  f r o n t  f o r  a n  a n t i c o m m u n i s t  c r u s a d e . "  T h i s  
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was the first PAP attack on Walesa since martial law was 
declared. 
02/21/82 -- The Polish martial law government published a statement 
- o n  trade union policy. 
02/19/82 -- Polish government spokesman Jerzy Urban said that a priest 
had been arrested and was being tried for giving a sermon 
slandering Gen. Jaruzelski. 
02/18/82 -- Radio Warsaw charged that some "lower Catholic clergyw 
were "rekindling old sources of conflict," according 
to the Washington Post. 
02/17/82 -- The official Polish news agency, PAP, reported that 
about 4,000 Poles were arrested over a two-day period. 
No dates were given for the action, officially known 
as "Operation Calm." Police dealt with 145,000 
violations of martial law during the "operation." 
Most of the violations were of curfew regulations. 
02/16/82 -- Father Henryk Jankowski, Lech Walesaps parish priest, 
spoke to reporters about his visit with Walesa. 
Walesa said that he had issued no statements since 
being confined by martial law authorities. 
02/15/82 -- The Polish Communist Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, 
published ifs most extensive attack so far on resistance 
to martial law. 
02/13/82 -- The New York Times reported that Poland had signed a trade 
agreement with China. The agreement for 1982 provides for 
a 25% increase in trade. 
02/11/82 -- The first anniversary of Gen. Jaruzelski's appointment 
to Premier of Poland was marked by tributes in the Polish 
press. 
02/09/82 -- At the Madrid meeting to review the Helsinki accords, 
U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig charged that 
Polish authorities had violated the Helsinki accords and 
that "through intimidation and interference, the Soviet 
Union has conspired with the Polish military authorities...." 
Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Wiejacz, the chairman 
for that session, announced that he was adjourning the 
session. 
-- At a special audience for an international group of 
labor leaders, Pope John Paul I 1  said that a 
restoration of Solidarity was the only way out of the 
Polish crisis. The Pope's statement followed a 
sermon in Rome by Polish Primate Archbishop Jozef Glemp. 
02/08/82 -- Polish universities reopened after a forced 2-month recess. 
02/07/82 -- In Rome to Consult with Pope John Paul 11, Polish Primate 
Archbishop Jozef Glemp said that "Poles are overcome by 
anger.... A place will be found for Solidarity, as there 
is a place for the church." 
01/36/82 -- Street clashes in Gdansk resulted in 14 injuries and 205 
arrests.. 101 youths were sentenced to jail terms of one 
to three months. "Solidarity Day" with Poland was observed 
in the U.S. 
01/26/82 -- In a speech to the Sejm, Gen. Jaruzelski said that there 
were 4,549 internees and that 1,760 people had been 
released. 
-- Before meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that 
Gen. Jaruzelski's Jan. 25 speech was "a disappointmentw and 
"essentially an effort to justify the continuing repression 
of the Polish people." 
-- One hand was raised when the Sejm was asked whether anyone 
opposed the martial law decrees imposed in December. There 
were - 
six abstentions. 
01/25/82 -- After hearing a policy statement'by General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, the Polish Sejm (parliament) endorsed 
martial law as preferable to confrontation. 
- - In his address to the Sejm, Poland's military ruler 
General Jaruzelski promised some.relaxation of martial 
law regulations by the end of February, but said that 
control over the Solidarity movement would remain strict. 
01/24/82 -- Polish Primate Archbishop Jozef Glemp said that Poles 
had the right to honest information and the right to 
know why they were being deprived of civil liberties. 
Glemp's sermon was broadcast over national radio. 
He warned that curbs on freedom could lead to 
protest and war.- 
-- .A pastoral letter from Poland's Roman Catholic bishops 
was read in most Polish churches. The letter called for 
the restoration of freedoms revoked under martial law. 
Pope John Paul I1 endorsed the pastoral letter and urged 
all Catholics to pray "for my fatherland." 
01/22/82 -- Warsaw radio reported that Poland sent a note to 34 
nations warning them against attempting to denounce 
Poland's martial law regime at the Feb. Madrid meeting 
to review the Helsinki accords. 
01/21/82 -- A petition signed by more than 100 intellectuals and 
artists was sent to the Sejm and to Primate Archbishop 
Glemp. The petition demanded the lifting of martial 
law, the release of detainees, and resumption of a 
dialogue with Church and Solidarity representatives. 
-- The European Common Market withdrew a proposal to supply- 
over $236 million in food aid to the Polish government. 
This was the first sanction imposed against Poland's 
-- 
d e l i v e r i e s "  
mar t i a l  l a w  g o v e r n m e n t  by W e s t e r n  E u r o p e .  Aid  t h r o u g h  
n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s h o u l d  i n c r e a s e ,  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  G a s t o n  T h o r n ,  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Common M a r k e t  Commiss ion .  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  t h e  P o l i s h  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  o f  
t h e  C a t h o l i c  e p i s c o p a t e  met i n  Warsaw. 
Warsaw r a d i o  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  D e p u t y  Premier  M i e c z y s l a w  Rakowsk i  
met  w i t h  f o r e i g n  j o u r n a l i s t s  i n  Warsaw. He t o l d  t hem t h a t  
mar t i a l  l a w  was " e s s e n t i a l  b e c a u s e  a l l  p o s s i b l e  a v a i l a b l e  
p o l i t i c a l  means  b y  w h i c h  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  w a n t e d  t o  h a l t  
t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  d i s m a n t l i n g  t h e  economy a n d  s t a t e  s t r u c t u r e s "  
h a d  f a i l e d .  He s a id  t h a t  no  d a t e  h a d  b e e n  s e t  f o r  l i f t i n g  
mar t ia l  l a w  a n d  t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  p l a n n e d  t o  u s e  t h e  
p e r i o d  t o  i n t r o d u c e  e c o n o m i c  r e f o r m s ,  i n c l u d i n g  p r i c e  
i n c r e a s e s .  
P A P ,  t h e  o f f i c i a l  P o l i s h  news  a g e n c y  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  
m u s t  r a i s e  p r i c e s  o f  f o o d ,  c l o t h i n g ,  a n d  o t h e r  n e c c e s s i t i e s  
t o  p r e v e n t  t a t a l  e c o n o m i c  c o l l a p s e .  
S u n d a y  mass was b r o a d c a s t  on  P o l i s h  r a d i o  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  
s i n c e  m a r t i a l  l a w  was d e c l a r e d .  
P o l i s h  P r i m a t e  A r c h b i s h o p  Glemp c r i t i c i z e d  t h e  m i l i t a r y  
g o v e r n m e n t  f o r  e x t r a c t i n g  f l o y a l t y  o a t h s f 1  f r o m  P o l e s .  
The S o v i e t  news  a g e n c y ,  TASS, a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  
w o u l d  s e n d  m e d i c a l  s u p p l i e s ,  b l a n k e t s ,  d r i e d  m i l k ,  a n d  s u g a r  
t o  c e n t r a l  P o l a n d  w h i c h  was h i t  by  f l o o d s .  
The P o l i s h  Communist  P a r t y  n e w s p a p e r ,  T r y b u n a  Ludu ,  s a id  t h a t  
i f  f a r m e r s  d i d  n o t  i n c r e a s e  d e l i v e r e i s ,  " o b l i g a t o r y  
o f  g r a i n  m i g h t  be  i m p o s e d .  
P o l i s h  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  J o z e f  C z y r e k  was i n  Moscow f o r  two  
d a y s  o f  t a l k s  w i t h  S o v i e t  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  A n d r e i  Gromyko a n d  - 
o t h e r  s e n i o r  o f f i c i a l s .  
T e l e p h o n e  s e r v i c e  was r e s t o r e d  i n  Warsaw 2 9  d a y s  
a f t e r  mar t ia l  l a w  was d e c l a r e d .  
C e n s o r s h i p  o f  f o r e i g n  news  r e p o r t s  was l i f t e d .  
The P o l i s h  m i l i t a r y  g o v e r n m e n t  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  1 7  
p e o p l e  h a d  d i e d  s i n c e  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  mart ia l  l a w .  
T h i s  was more  t h a n  d o u b l e  t h e  t o t a l  p r e v i o u s l y  
a n n o u n c e d .  
The S o v i e t  Union  a n n o u n c e d  a g r a n t  t o  P o l a n d  o f  $ 3 . 4  
b i l l i o n  i n  t r a d e  c r e d i t s  o n  e a s y  t e r m s .  
D e p u t y  P r e m i e r  Rakowsk i  v i s i t e d  Bonn f o r  two d a y s .  
H e  s a i d  t h a t  W e s t e r n  a t t e m p t s  t o  u s e  e c o n o m i c  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  P o l a n d  a m o u n t e d  t o  i n t e r f e r e n c e  
i n  P o l i s h  i n t e r n a l  a f f a i r s .  
1 2 / 2 9 / 8 1  -- P r e s i d e n t  R e a g a n  a n n o u n c e d  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a s e r i e s  
o f  e c o n o m i c  s a n c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  S o v i e t  U n i o n  f o r  i t s  
p a r t  i n  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  mar t ia l  l a w  i n  P o l a n d .  
1 2 / 2 5 / 8 1  -- Warsaw r a d i o  r e p o r t e d . t h a t ' m o r e  t h a n  1 , 2 0 0  c o a l  
m i n e r s  w e r e  s t i l l  c o n d u c t i n g  a s i t - i n  i n  t h e  P i a s t  c o a l  
m i n e  i n  K a t a w i c e .  T h e  p r o t e s t  b e g a n  on  D e c .  1 4 .  
1 2 / 2 4 / 8 1  -- Z d z i s l a w  R u r a r z ,  t h e  P o l i s h  a m b a s s a d o r  t o  J a p a n ,  d e f e c t e d  
t o  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  
1 2 / 2 3 / 8 1  -- I n  a  n a t i o n a l l y  t e l e v i s e d  s p e e c h ,  P r e s i d e n t  R e a g a n  
a n n o u n c e d  a s e r i e s  o f  e c o n o m i c  s a n c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
P o l i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  i t s  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  
mar t ia l  l a w .  
1 2 / 2 2 / 8 1  -- Warsaw r a d i o  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  c u r f e w  w o u l d  b e  l i f t e d  o n  
C h r i s t m a s  E v e  s o  t h a t  p e o p l e  c o u l d  a t t e n d  m i d n i g h t  m a s s .  
-- Warsaw r a d i o ' s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s e r v i c e  r e s u m e d  b r o a d c a s t i n g  
f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  s i n c e  Dec.  1 2 .  
1 2 / 2 1 / 8 1  -- P o l i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  s p o k e s m a n  J e r z y  U r b a n  c o n f i r m e d  t h a t  
W a l e s a  was b e i n g  h e l d  i n  Warsaw a n d  w o u l d  b e  r e l e a s e d  
" a s  s o o n  a s  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  a l l o w s . M  
-- I n  a n  i n t e r v i e w  b r o a d c a s t  on  Warsaw r a d i o ,  P o l i s h  
g o v e r n m e n t  S p o k e s m a n  J e r z y  U r b a n  s a i d  t h a t  5 , 0 0 0  
p e o p l e  h a d  b e e n  d e t a i n e d  a n d  t h a t  some h a d  a l r e a d y  
b e e n  r e l e a s e d .  
-- P o l i s h  g o v e r n m e n t  s p o k e s m a n  J e r z y  U r b a n  c o n f i r m e d  t h a t  
W a l e s a  was b e i n g  h e l d  i n  Warsaw a n d  w o u l d  b e  r e l e a s e d  "as 
s o o n  as  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y  a l l o w s . "  
-- Moscow T A S S  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  t h o u s a n d s  o f  w o r k e r s  h a d  
b a r r i c a d e d  t h e m s e l v e s  i n s i d e  t h e  K a t o w i c e  s t e e l  m i l l .  
1 2 / 2 0 / 8 1  - - . R a d i o  Warsaw a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  P o l a n d ' s  B a l t i c  s h i p y a r d s  
w o u l d  be  s h u t  down u n t i l  a f t e r  C h r i s t m a s  a n d  w a r n e d  
f a r m e r s  t h a t  t h e y  m i g h t  b e  c o m p e l l e d  t o  s p e e d  u p  f o o d  
d e l i v e r i e s .  
-- T h e  p o l i s h  a m b a s s a d o r  t o  t h e  U . S .  Romuald  S p a s o w s k i ,  a s k e d  
f o r  a n d  was g r a n t e d  p o l i t i c a l  a s y l u m  i n  t h e  U . S .  
1 2 / 1 9 / 8 1  -- T h e  o f f i c i a l  n e w s  a g e n c y ,  PAP, r e p o r t e d  t h a t  a u t h o r i t i e s  
h a d  c o n f i s c a t e d  5 0 0  r o u n d s  o f  a m m u n i t i o n ,  g r e n a d e s ,  
f i r e a r m s ,  a n d  i r o n  bars i n  t h e  S z c z e c i n  r e p a i r  s h i p y a r d .  
-- Warsaw r a d i o  r e p o r t e d  c o n t i n u i n g  s t r i k e s  i n  G d a n s k ,  S o p o t ,  
a n d  G d y n i a .  M a s s i v e  f o o d  s h i p m e n t s  f r o m  Eas t  Germany  a r r i v e d  
i n  Warsaw. 
1 2 / 1 8 / 8 1  -- F o r e i g n  j o u r n a l i s t s  w e r e  g i v e n  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  f i l e  
c e n s o r e d  d i s p a t c h e s  o v e r  a s i n g l e  t e l e x  l i n e  f r o m  
t h e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t r y ' s  p r e s s  c e n t e r .  
12/17/81 -- Riot police in Warsaw used nightsticks and tear gas to 
disperse thousands of Poles defying the martial law 
curfew to mark the 11th anniversary of the 1970 
Baltic coast food riots which resulted in dozens of 
deaths. 
-- Warsaw radio reported that seven Poles were killed and 
hundreds wounded in clashes with troops enforcing martial 
law. The deaths occurred at a coal mine near Katowice 
in Silesia. 
12/16/81 -- In the first communication from Polish banking authorities 
since martial law was declared, Poland asked its major 
creditors to lend it an additional $350 million to help 
pay the interest Poland owed on $2.4 billion in loans due 
to Western banks. 
-- Warsaw radio reported demonstrations in Gdansk. 160 
militiamen and 164 civilians were reported injured. 
- 
-- Heavily armed Polish troops led by tanks stormed the Lenin 
steel works. Some strikers were beaten and the others 
threatened With being shot if they did not return to work. 
The steel works were partially operating later in the day. 
12/15/81 -- The Polish government froze all private bank a'ccounts 
containing hard currency and suspended all foreign 
remittances and other orders requiring foreign exchange. 
- - A U.S. State Department spokesman announced that U.S. 
economic aid already "in the pipeline" to Poland would 
be allowed to proceed, but that decisions on future economic 
assistance would be postponed pending clarification of the 
Polish situation. 
12/14/81 -- Coal miners at the Piast coal mine in Katowice province 
in southern POlaFid began a sit-in strike in the mine. 
On Dec. 25, more than 1,000 miners were reported still 
-underground. 
-- All normal cable, telex, and telephone communications 
with Poland were shut off. 
-- The Polish government announced that 150 factories 
had been "militarized." Disobedience could result 
in penalties ranging from two years in prison to death. 
12/13/81 -- Shortly after 3 a.m., police occupied Solidarity's 
Warsaw headquarters, confiscated union property, and 
cut communication lines. 
-- At 6 a.m., General Jaruzelski delivered a speech on 
radio announcing the imposition of martial law at 
midnight on Dec. 12 and asking Polish workers to 
"give up, for the Fatherland, your inalienable right 
to strike, for such a period as may be necessary." 
12/12/81 -- At midnight, the Polish Council of State issued a 
proclamation declaring a state of emergency and 
introducing martial law. At the same time, a 
"Military Council of National Salvationw was formed. 
- - A Gdansk meeting of Solidarity's 107-member 
policy-making national commission adopted the demands 
made at Radom on Dec. 3 as the basis for the union's 
program. 
12/10/81 -- A TASS report charged that Solidarity had set up 
"commando units" and had stolen weapons and explosives 
from state warehouses. The report stated that 
Solidarity planned to take over Polish radio and 
television on Dec. 17. 
